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INTRODUCTION
This paper explores contemporary American laws on paternity as of
the time of the live birth of a child conceived through sexual intercourse.
In doing so it necessarily examines the roles of biological ties in all
determinations of legal parenthood. It does not speak directly to legal
paternity arising from the use of reproductive technology; to legal
fatherhood arising long after birth for reasons unrelated to biology; or, to
actual fatherhood, which remains unrecognized under law. It does assume
that there can be no legal paternity of an unborn child,' though there
t Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University. B.A., Colby College; J.D., University
of Chicago. The paper was prompted by a presentation made as part of a National Institutes
of Health project, Grant No. ROI HG 0285-01, entitled "Genetic Ties and the Future of the
Family." My thanks to Mark A. Rothstein, the Principal Investigator, major collaborators
Thomas H. Murray, Mary R. Anderlik and Greg Kaebnick, and my other colleagues in the
project for their comments on my presentation. Thanks also to my research assistant Jason
Spence. Errors are solely mine.
1. Cf. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/7 (West 2002) ("An action to determine the
existence of the father and child relationship... may be brought by... a pregnant
woman... or a man presumed or alleging himself to be the father of the.., expected
child." Yet proceedings in an action brought before birth are usually "stayed until after the
birth."); A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 949 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (Biological
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certainly may be prospective legal paternity that prompts parental-like
status for pregnant dads.2  And, it does recognize there can be both
retroactive legal paternity and presumptive legal paternity.3 In the former,
paternity based upon biology is established long after birth, but relates back
in time to the date of birth. In the latter, there is a presumption of paternity
at the time of birth that usually assumes, but need not actually involve (as
with marriage), biological ties.
For men, legal paternity designations may result in parental rights or
responsibilities. 4  These rights can involve such matters as childrearing,
monetary recovery under tort or probate laws, or child visitation. These
responsibilities can involve such matters as child support or special duties
under tort or criminal laws. For children, legal paternity designations
usually provide rights, if not responsibilities. Children's rights can include
child support as well as special protections under tort, probate, or criminal
laws.
5
In exploring legal paternity, the paper necessarily examines
differences in assigning parental rights and parental responsibilities, though
parents of unborn child carried by a surrogate only able to place their names on birth
certificate seventy-two or more hours after birth, since surrogate may only relinquish
parental rights then); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 611, 9B U.L.A. 345 (2000), (Prebirth
proceedings to determine parentage may be commenced, but may not be concluded until
after birth). But see Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1138
(Mass. 2001) (The court can consider ordering hospital to place names of genetic parents on
birth certificates even before children are delivered by gestational carriers.); see also
Geoffrey P. Miller, Custody and Couvade: The Importance ofPaternal Bonding in the Law
of Family Relations, 33 IND. L. REv. 691, 735-36 (2000) (urging laws should better
recognize paternal bonding - including emotional connection with a child or fetus and role
identification - that does or can occur during the preconception, pregnancy and at birth
stages of human reproduction).
2. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Pregnant Dads: The Crimes and Other Misconduct of
Expectant Fathers, 72 OR. L. REv. 901, 912-18 (1993).
3. See infra Part I.A.
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See infra note 28-31. Not considered herein are any children's rights derived from
federal or state constitutions (as due process associational rights involving fathers). See,
e.g., Ovando v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1018 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ("Thus,
the law in this circuit is quite clear: a child has a [federal] substantive due process right in
her relationship with her parents which may be vindicated through a [42 U.S.C.] Section
1983 action."); Webster v. Ryan, 729 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316-18, 341-42 (Fam. Ct. 2001) (A
child "has an independent, constitutionally guaranteed right to maintain contact with a
person with whom the child has developed a parent-like relationship," here a foster mother,
which must be balanced against a custodial biological father's rights where the father
objects to contact.), cited with approval in, Meldrum v. Novotny, 640 N.W.2d 460, 470
(S.D. 2002); cf. Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding
"that any liberty interest arising in the preservation of a biologically unrelated foster family
would arise, if at all, only under state law".).
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recognizing that the two often go hand-in-hand. As well, it explores
differences guiding legal maternity and legal paternity determinations.
6
The major thesis of the paper is that old-fashioned pregnancies require
newly-fashioned paternity laws. Consideration of new laws is facilitated
by advances in scientific testing. Law reform is necessary because existing
laws too often mistreat dads by unfairly eliminating paternal rights or
unfairly assigning paternal responsibilities. 7 The chief concerns here are
with the procedures, not with the substantive norms, employed by
American governments, usually states,8 for designating legal paternity. 9
The chief goal is to promote legal paternity designations "consistent with
orderly procedure without unnecessary involvement in procedural quirks,
complications and limitations."
10
I. FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN PATERNITY LAWS
Lawyers and non-lawyers alike frequently misunderstand
contemporary American paternity laws and their relationships with laws on
maternity. A brief review of a few undeniable premises seems necessary
before exploring legal paternity procedures and possible paternity law
reforms.
A. Legal Paternity
Public policy supports early, accurate, informed, and conclusive legal
designations of paternity as of the time of birth. A 1992 federal study,
entitled "Supporting Our Children," said this:
Parentage determination does more than provide genealogical clues
to a child's background; it establishes fundamental emotional, social,
legal and economic ties between parent and child. It is a prerequisite
to securing financial support for the child and to developing the
heightened emotional support the child derives from enforceable
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See infra Part I.
8. But see Scales v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing procedures
for establishing parentage for U.S. citizenship purposes and finding there is no need to
establish blood relationship with the U.S. citizen said to be the father).
9. This paper draws significantly from and expands upon an earlier work. Jeffrey A.
Pamess, Designating Male Parents At Birth, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 573, 591-92 (1993)
(concluding that current designations of a child's male parentage as of the time of birth
often are made inconsistently, fortuitously, inconclusively, and without involving all
interested parties).
10. Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. 1965) (Steakey, J., dissenting).
2003]
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custody and visitation rights. Parentage determination also unlocks
the door to government provided dependent's benefits, inheritance,
and an accurate medical history for the child.11
Legal paternity differs from legal fatherhood and actual fatherhood.
Paternity under law involves a man with legally-recognized rights,
responsibilities, or both, as the father of a newborn. Legal paternity can
arise from varying acts including, paternity registrations, birth
acknowledgments, and child support payments. On occasion, presumptions
prompt designations of legal paternity, as with husbands 12 or former
husbands 13 or former boyfriends 14 of women who bear children.15 Every so
often, more than one presumption may arise for a single child, often
requiring courts to weigh competing presumptions. 16  By contrast, legal
fatherhood involves a man with comparable, if not the same,17 rights and
11. U.S. COMM'N ON INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT, SUPPORTING OUR CHILDREN: A
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 120 (1992). See also James A. Gaudino Jr., et al., No Fathers'
Names: A Risk Factor for Infant Mortality in the State of Georgia, USA, 48 Soc. SCI. &
MED. 253, 263 (1999) (concluding that "Missing fathers' names on birth certificates, a
measure of paternity, was a more important risk factor for infant mortality in Georgia than
unmarried status. This finding suggests that fathers, in some way, may influence infant
health.").
12. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-304(a) (2001) ("A man is rebuttably presumed
to be the father of a child if: (1)... [He] and the child's mother are married... and the
child is born during the marriage.").
13. See, e.g., id. ("A man is rebuttably presumed to be the father of a child if: (1)...
[He] and the child's mother... have been married to each other and the child is born...
within three hundred (300) days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment,
declaration of invalidity, or divorce .... ").
14. See, e.g., In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 933, 941 (Cal. 2002) (Mother's former
boyfriend who received child into his home and openly held the child out as his natural child
is presumed to be natural father; this presumption is not necessarily rebutted when the man
admits he is not the biological dad).
15. See also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5(a)(3) (West 2002) ("A man is presumed
to be the natural father of a child if... he and the child's natural mother have signed an
acknowledgment of paternity."); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5(b)(1) (West 2002) (The
presumption is "conclusive" unless rescinded within sixty days.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 45/6(d) (West 2002) ("A signed acknowledgment of paternity... may be challenged
in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.").
16. See, e.g., In re Kiana A., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 675-680 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (A
rebuttable presumption founded on marriage after birth and inclusion on birth certificate
competes with rebuttable presumption based upon receipt of child into the home and
acknowledgment of biological ties; in weighing, biological ties are not determinative).
17. Cf., e.g., Exparte D.W., No. 1001467, 2002 WL 193868, at *4 (Ala. Feb. 8, 2002)
(The legislature could qualify rights of adopting couples by allowing visitation rights for
certain natural grandparents of adoptees). See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-70
(2000) (The legislature cannot usually override wishes of fit biological parents regarding
visitation rights of natural grandparents).
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responsibilities who is recognized under law some time after a child is born
for reasons unrelated to biological ties.18 For example, equitable estoppel
forecloses denials of legal fatherhood by men who have actually fathered,
though there is some good chance that the biological father can be pursued
in paternity for child support. 19 Beyond any laws, of course, many men
actually assume rights and undertake responsibilities for children without
any recognition under law. Such actual fatherhood occasionally helps to
establish legal fatherhood 20 or to establish legal paternity retroactively. Yet
many actual fathers can never gain legal recognition; some, in fact, may be
removed from their children due to a later-recognized legal paternity or
legal fatherhood of another. Thus, a legal paternity designation for one
man can override the actual fatherhood of a second man in some settings.
Yet elsewhere, a later legal paternity designation for one man can be
foreclosed by the actual fatherhood of another man.21 Many children have
two or more different men recognized in legal paternity, or as legal fathers,
or as actual fathers.
Legal paternity usually differs both in procedure and in substance
from legal maternity. 22 Thus, American birth certificate laws usually treat
18. Legal fatherhood conceivably may be designated for a biological father where the
opportunity for childrearing rights based on biology was earlier lost so that legal paternity as
of the time of birth is precluded, (as with a failure to step up to parenthood), but where there
is 'revived' legal paternity that translates into legal fatherhood, as with adoption.
19. See, e.g., W. v. W., 779 A.2d 716, 720 (Conn. 2001) (From the child's perspective
there is representation (positive act by man), reliance (by child), and detriment (to child)).
Incidentally, estoppel may not be available to a biological father fighting a paternity suit
(seeking recovery of governmental financial aid) even when earlier the biological mother
and another man actually parented the child for at least six to eight years and where the
child still believes the other man is the dad. Hjame v. Martin, No. FA000631333, 2002 WL
1163023, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 7, 2002).
20. See, e.g., Floyd v. Floyd, No. M2000-02344-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 997380, at *3
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2001) (Child visitation rights for former stepfather coupled with
support responsibilities per private agreement with the biological mom created no legal duty
for the stepfather, but was within marital dissolution court authority). See also Cumberland
County Bd. Of Soc. Servs. v. W.J.P., 755 A.2d 1171, 1172 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)
(guidelines on legal duties assignable to stepparents who act "in loco parentis"). Cf. Poore
v. Poore, No. E2001-01250-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 181361, at *1-2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)
(Primacy of biological mother's custodial rights in divorce proceeding with stepparent who
may be a more fit parent).
21. See, e.g., Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99, 101 (Ga. 2001) (describing how a recent
statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-1(b.1) (2002), altered the guidelines for determining
conflicts between biological parents and a limited number of third parties who may be
actual, but are not legal, parents, including grandparents, aunts, uncles, siblings and
prospective adoptive parents; the statute replaced a parental unfitness standard with a best-
interest-of-the-child standard, making it somewhat easier for third parties to prevail).
22. See infra Part I.B.
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differently a biological mom and a biological dad.23 A biological mom is
nearly always noted on a birth certificate while a biological dad frequently
is not. 24 Further, federal constitutional rights involving childrearing arise
quite differently for a biological mom and dad.25 For a mom, these rights
arise from childbirth alone; 26 for a dad, these rights only arise after he
"grasps" the opportunity to develop a relationship with his offspring and
"accepts some measure of responsibility for his child's future." 27
Legal paternity is important in many different settings. Within a
single American state and between different American states, there may be
varying approaches to legal paternity for child support duties;28 child
custody and visitation rights;29 tort law duties;30 rights under probate
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., Child Support
Enforcement Div. v. Michael George K., 531 S.E.2d 669, 671 (W.Va. 2000).
25. See infra pp. 67-68.
26. A biological mom herein is a woman who is both the genetic and the gestational
mother, as the paper concerns only old-fashioned pregnancies. Where reproductive
technology produces a pregnancy with both a gestational mom and a genetic mom, there is
usually different legal treatment of the moms. Thus, childbirth alone, in the absence of
genetic ties, has been said to prompt no federal constitutional protections. See, e.g., Perry-
Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (App. Div. 2000) (Gestational mother unconnected
genetically [mistakenly implanted embryos] had no entitlement to court-ordered visitation).
27. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). Lehr is illustrated in In re Adoption
of J.L.G., 808 So.2d 491, 498-99 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (Unwed father failed to manifest
substantial commitment to child as required by statute, so his consent to adoption was
unnecessary).
The nature (the types of decisions embodied in childrearing) and the breadth (the reach
of childrearing authority, as where there are conflicting interests of grandparents) of federal
constitutional childrearing rights were examined in Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66 (employing a
case-by-case analysis in determining whether parental decisions involving "care, custody,
and control" of children can override state interests in allowing paternal grandparent
visitations found to be in the best interests of children, but contrary to parental wishes). See
also Blakely v. Blakely, No. SC83307, 2002 WL 1364019, at *1 (Mo. June 25, 2002)
(Notwithstanding Troxel, limited grandparent visitation order was not unconstitutional).
28. For example, American state laws vary on the types of harm (emotional or
financial) to children of divorcing parents, which will bar husbands from escaping future
child support responsibilities though they prove lack of biological ties. See, e.g., B.E.B. v.
R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514, 515-16 (Alaska 1999) (reviewing state precedents on paternity by
estoppel). And they may vary on whether during a divorce a couple can consent to the
voluntary termination of the husband's parental rights, allowing him to be relieved of child
support payments. See, e.g., DiPaolo v. Cugini, 2002 WL 31565822 at *1 n.2 (Pa. Super.
2002) (finding Pennsylvania laws, but not New Jersey laws, deem such consent a nullity).
29. For example, American state laws vary on whether biological fathers can have
visitation (and support duties) for children bom into intact marriages where the married
couple objects. Compare Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 186-92 (Iowa 1999) (state
constitution recognizes standing of such biological fathers) with Ex parte C.A.P., 683 So.2d
1010, 1011-12 (Ala. 1996) (the state does not recognize such standing).
30. For example, American state laws vary on whether there can be legal paternity of a
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laws;31 and, criminal law duties.32 For legal paternity, both substantive and
procedural laws often vary depending upon context. Thus, substantive
legal paternity norms often differ for civil child support and for criminal
child support.33  As well, the procedures for establishing legal paternity
often differ for child custody, tort, and probate purposes.34  Within
American states, there are varying approaches, both substantively and
procedurally, to the rebuttal of presumptions of legal paternity founded on
marriage.
35
fetus so as to allow recovery under a wrongful death statute. See, e.g., Bolin v. Wingert, 764
N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ind. 2002) (reviewing differing approaches which often depend on the
viability of the fetus).
31. For example, emerging American state laws vary on inheritance rights of
posthumously conceived children. Compare Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d
257, 272 (Mass. 2002) (under Massachusetts intestate succession laws, natural children
could inherit under "limited circumstances" involving consent and timing requirements)
with In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000)
("routinely grant" status as heir unless doing so would unfairly intrude on rights of other
persons or cause serious problems in the orderly administration of estates).
32. For example, American state laws vary on whether there can be legal paternity of a
fetus so as to prompt possible application of criminal child support laws applicable to
parents. Usually, criminal statutes are read quite narrowly, thus precluding doctrines used in
civil claim settings such as the "born alive rule." See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Booth, 766
A.2d 843, 848 n.7 (Pa. 2001). Some states have explicitly included the unborn as victims of
child support crimes. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (1999) (child conceived but not yet
born is to be deemed an existing person).
33. See, e.g., State v. Burg, 648 N.W.2d 673, 677-678 (Minn. 2002) (Criminal offense
of nonsupport of child required prosecutors to prove beyond reasonable doubt all elements
including knowing omissions and absence of lawful excuse). Thus, only under the criminal
laws may the non-supporting legal fathers need to know of their children's existence and of
their responsibilities to support them under law.
34. In the child custody setting only the potential legal fathers, the biological mothers,
the children, and the state (especially if it is providing child support) may have standing to
litigate legal paternity, while in the inheritance setting, more actual and alleged family
members may have standing and in the tort setting, strangers (as those sued for damages
involving injured family relations) may have standing. See, e.g., Estate of Griswold, 24
P.3d 1191, 1194 (Cal. 2001) (Half siblings may recover from intestate estate of a man born
out of wedlock and biologically linked to their father because the father "acknowledged the
child" and "contributed to the support or care of the child" as required by the Probate Code,
even though the father never met the man and the siblings did not learn of the man until
after he died). See also Jackson v. Newsome, 758 N.E.2d 342, 346 (II!. App. Ct. 2001)
(recognizing that parentage acknowledgment procedures differ under Vital Records Act and
Uniform Parentage Act) and Taylor v. Hoffman, 544 S.E.2d 387, 394 (W.Va. 2001)
(limitations period for child support action by child based on paternity differs from
limitations period for inheritance action by child seeking "heirship" rights).
35. States differ on whether certain legal paternity presumptions may be rebutted by
certain people; they also differ on the weight and nature of evidence that may be used to
rebut a legal paternity presumption. See, e.g., Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child:
Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 547
(2000); Diana S. Kaplan, Why Truth is Not a Defense in Paternity Actions, 10 TEX. J.
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Finally, a frequently misunderstood premise is that legal paternity can
be designated in order to assign parental responsibilities to a man who is
not then entitled (and may never truly be entitled) to exercise parental
rights. 36 Thus, a man who failed to establish a parent-child relationship
that would have triggered childrearing rights, can nevertheless be pursued
later for child support under laws based solely upon biological ties.37 An
award and the payment of child support by such a man may, but need not,
revive the chance for securing parental rights based on legal paternity.
38
B. Differentiating Maternity and Paternity Laws
As noted, the legal standards guiding maternity and paternity differ in
both procedure and substance. Some differences have been sustained by
the United States Supreme Court. For federal constitutional childrearing
rights, the Court has recognized differences between biological moms and
biological dads of children conceived through sexual intercourse. 39 In a
dissent in 1979, which has since been widely used,4° Justice Stewart wrote:
Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships
WOMEN & L. 69 (2000).
36. The false linkage of parental rights and parental responsibilities may arise, in part,
because laws often join the two as if they were interdependent. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 384-b(l)(ii) (McKinney 2002) ("[I]t is generally desirable for the child to remain or
be returned to the birth parent because the child's need for a normal family life will usually
best be met in the home of its birth parent, and that parents are entitled to bring up their own
children unless the best interests of the child would be endangered.").
37. See, e.g., Klak v. Skellion, 741 N.E.2d 288, 289 (II1. App. Ct. 2000) While a
seventeen year old woman cannot sue by herself to establish parent-child relationship based
on male biological ties, suit could be brought by her mother or legal guardian until she is
eighteen and suit could be brought by woman herself when she is eighteen to twenty years
of age. Id. at 291.
38. To date, there has been little talk of revived parental rights for men first assigned
child support duties on behalf of older children. Yet in certain parental adoption settings
involving older children, participation rights are afforded unwed biological fathers only
because they developed actual parent-child relationships some time after birth, though at the
time of birth their parental rights had not accrued and early-age adoptions could have
proceeded without their participation. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and
(iii) (2002) (abandoned children may prompt parental rights terminations and adoption
availability; abandonment includes a biological father's failure to provide pre-birth financial
support for 4 months before birth, but may only be proven more than 30 days after birth,
suggesting that provision of some child support during the first 30 days after birth disallows
a finding of abandonment at birth).
39. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979).
40. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 (J. Stevens, speaking for himself
and five other justices, deems J. Stewart's observations correct).
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more enduring. The mother carries and bears the child, and in
this sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the
father's parental claims must be gauged by other measures. By
tradition, the primary measure has been the legitimate familial
relationship he creates with the child by marriage with the
mother.... In some circumstances the actual relationship
between father and child may suffice to create in the ... father
parental interests .... 41
The differing legal treatment at birth of biological moms and
biological dads extends beyond the types of "enduring" relationships
necessary for federal constitutional rights.42 In June 2001, when exploring
the different procedures for women and men seeking parental rights by
proving biological ties to children, Justice Kennedy explained:
The first governmental interest to be served is the importance
of assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists. In
the case of the mother, the relation is verifiable from the birth
itself. The mother's status is documented in most instances by
the birth certificate or hospital records and the witnesses who
attest to her having given birth.
In the case of the father, the uncontestable fact is that he need
not be present at the birth. If he is present, furthermore, that
circumstance is not incontrovertible proof of fatherhood....
Fathers and mothers are not similarly situated with regard to the
proof of biological parenthood. The imposition of a different set
of rules for making that legal determination with respect to
fathers and mothers is neither surprising nor troublesome from a
constitutional perspective.
43
41. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (J. Stewart, dissenting).
42. See generally Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001). Occasionally, both
a biological dad and a biological mom are similarly treated at birth, as when they are
foreclosed from stepping up to parenthood, because their unfitness is shown at birth. See,
e.g., In re R.B.S., 36 P.3d 300, 305 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (Violent and abusive conduct and
neglect of older son prior to his death allowed court to find a newborn to be a child in need
of governmental care). At times, however, biological dads are foreclosed from stepping up
to parenthood, because of certain acts, though biological moms who committed similar acts
are not precluded. See, e.g., In re Termination of Parental Rights to Quianna M.M., 2001
WL 1046974, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2001) (Statute barring parenthood for those
committing sexual assaults leading to births applied only to biological fathers and thus not
to biological moms whose pregnancies resulted from their criminal sexual assaults of young
boys).
43. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62-63 (citations omitted).
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Justice Stewart recognizes certain substantive law differences between
biological moms and biological dads.44  While he declares that parental
rights require more than "biological connection," he finds the necessary
"enduring" relationship for a mom can arise from biology alone, in that she
"carries and bears the child."45 For a man, an "enduring" relationship often
means an "actual relationship between father and child." 46 Justice Stewart
hints that such an actual relationship, developed as soon as humanly
possible, may still be insufficient for certain biological dads seeking legal
paternity.47 For example, it may be insufficient where a biological mom is
married to another man at the time of conception, pregnancy or birth.48 In
1989, though there was no majority opinion, Justice Scalia spoke for
himself and three others on the U.S. Supreme Court when he found that
California could allow an extant marital relationship to trump the biological
ties of a man who had, in fact, established a parent-child relationship.
49
Justice Scalia reasoned that where a "natural father's unique opportunity
[to grasp parenthood] conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the
husband of a marriage.., it is not unconstitutional for the State to give
categorical preference to the latter." 50 Otherwise, "to provide protection to
44. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397.
45. Id. As he spoke of biological ties in settings where sexual intercourse prompted
later births, and thus where all biological connections involved but one woman, seemingly
Justice Stewart left open the legal analyses for children born biologically connected to two
women, as in surrogacy settings. Id. See, e.g., Culliton, 756 N.E.2d at 1138 (Mass. 2001)
(The trial court may consider ordering a hospital to place the names of both genetic parents
on the birth certificates of children delivered by gestational carriers, even before birth).
46. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397. While Justice Stewart spoke of an "enduring"
relationship, in similar settings other Supreme Court Justices have employed such phrases as
"a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood," Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (J. Stevens)
(citing Caban, 441 U.S. at 392); a manifestation of "a significant paternal interest in a
child," Caban, 441 U.S. at 394 (J. Powell); and a coming "forward to participate in the
rearing" of the child, Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (J. Stevens) (citing Caban, 441 U.S. at 392).
47. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397.
48. Id.
49. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 115 (1989). The relevant California statute
said "the issue of a wife cohabitating with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage." Id. (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE §
621(a) (West 1989)). Extant marriages can also trump important and established
relationships between children and other blood relatives. See, e.g., Santi v. Santi, 633
N.W.2d 312, 314, 321 (Iowa 2001) (State constitutional childrearing rights of fit married
couple, who object, overcome any attempts by grandparents to gain court-ordered visitations
with grandchildren).
50. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129 (emphasis omitted). Cf Brian C. v. Ginger K., 92 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 294, 296 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2000) (finding it unconstitutional to give
categorical preference to husband where there was no marriage "in any meaningful sense"
and where an unwed biological father had "developed a substantial parent-child
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an adulterous natural father is to deny protection to a marital father."5' Not
all American states today permit such absolute trumping.
52
Where an "enduring" parent-child relationship, as described by Justice
relationship"). While the federal constitution recognizes there may be differences between
states in preferences and in other dimensions of state privacy rights involving childrearing,
federal constitutional privacy rights are at times coextensive with state constitutional
privacy rights. See, e.g., In re Custody of RRB, 31 P.3d 1212, 1222 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
51. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130. In California, this presumption was subject to
rebuttal by blood tests prompted by a motion within two years of the child's birth, pursued
either by the husband or, if the alleged natural father has acknowledged paternity by
affidavit, by the wife. Id. at 115 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(c) and (d) (West 1989)).
So, an adulterous natural father was protected in California, but only if the natural mother
who is the wife of another man, or the other man, also acts in a way that would prompt
protection for the adulterous natural father. Id. at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Today in
California, the conclusive presumption accorded a husband where a child is born into a
marriage may be rebutted by the husband, the mother, the child, or a man deemed a
"presumed father" under statute. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7540-41, 7611-12 (West 1994).
52. Cf Cihlar v. Crawford, 39 S.W.3d 172, 175 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (Tennessee
parentage statutes are constitutional though they allow a putative unwed natural father to
establish paternity of a child born to a married woman, even where she objects and where
her husband is a presumed father under law, who himself seeks to establish legal paternity);
C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365, 373 (Mass. 1990) (eliminating conclusive presumption of
legitimacy and allowing biological father to bring paternity action where there is strong
evidence of a substantial parent-child relationship); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 357 (Colo.
2000) (When there are competing presumptions in husband and biological dad, look to
child's best interests); Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 192 (Iowa 1999)
(Unconstitutional per state constitution to deny biological dad chance to establish paternity
when child born to married woman whose husband accepted the child as his own). The
demise of conclusive presumptions favoring husbands was perhaps explained by Nancy E.
Dowd, in her book Redefining Fatherhood, in which she said:
The strong link between social fathering and marriage connects nurturing by men
to an institution in decline, given the declining rate of marriage and the high rate
of divorce. Male parenting thereby parallels the episodic, serial character of
men's adult pairings. Ever since 1975, the first marriage rate has declined, the
divorce rate has risen, and the remarriage rate rose but then declined to a rate
similar to the first marriage rate. The change in family structures was profound.
Most young women in the 1950s got married by the time they were twenty and
quickly had two or three children. Almost eighty percent of all U.S. households
were married couples in 1950 .... During the 1950s, the marriage rate went up,
people began marrying earlier in their lives, and the divorce rate dropped
sharply .... Women were full-time mothers, especially those with young
children; men were bread winner fathers largely absent from the daily lives of
their children .... The decline in married households since the 1950s has been
significant: by the year 2000, married couple households will constitute only
about half of all U.S. households. Currently, many households are composed of
single individuals, or single-parent families. Marriage occurs later in life and does
not last as long. Half of all marriages end in divorce, although remarriage is also
frequent. Children are born later in their parents' lives, and families have fewer
children ....
NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 28-29 (2000).
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Stewart, is sufficient for a biological dad to secure legal paternity, the
necessary procedures may operate in several different ways. 53 As Justice
Kennedy noted, the "uncontestable fact" is that any technique necessarily
entails "a different set of rules" for moms and dads.54 At times no actual
relationship is, in fact, necessary to establish the "enduring" relationship
prompting legal paternity. 55 Justice Stewart noted that the male connection
may be proven by marriage to the biological mother or by an "actual
relationship between father and child."56 Elsewhere, a biological dad may
prove an "enduring" relationship under paternity laws by employing a
state-established paternity register; 57 by appearing on the birth certificate;
by swearing under oath or otherwise acknowledging paternity; 58 by
procuring a court order adjudicating paternity;59 or by providing child
support.
60
Whether or not substantive legal paternity norms require proof of
biological ties, for many of the relevant procedures alleged biological dads
will often depend upon the acts of biological moms to establish the
"enduring" relationships needed for legal paternity.6 1 Moms by themselves
can flee, fail to disclose a pregnancy, abandon a newborn or misrepresent
their sexual encounters. 62  Governmental procedures used by men to
establish biological ties or otherwise "enduring" relationships should take
account of the role of moms. For example, procedures in many settings
should allow biological dads access to testing or other proof so that they
may seize their "unique opportunity" to "grasp" legal paternity. Unfairness
arises when procedures fail to account for the "unique opportunity" of
53. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
54. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62-63.
55. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring).
56. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
57. See generally, e.g., Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry
Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1031 (2002) (proposal for a national putative father
registry database that will enhance and connect state and local registries).
58. See, e.g., In re Byrd, 552 S.E.2d 142, 147-48 (N.C. 2001). Acknowledgment alone
may be insufficient in some settings, as under adoption laws that require the consent of the
biological dad only where there has been an acknowledgment and the provision of "tangible
support." Id. at 148.
59. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 637(d), 9B U.L.A. 352 (2001). Not all court orders
recognizing paternity are adjudications of paternity. See, e.g., id. (all divorce decrees are
not accorded res judicata, the Act proposes divorce decrees are parentage adjudications
where they expressly use such terms as "issue" or "child" of the marriage).
60. See OR. REv. STAT. § 109.230 (2001) ("Any contract between the mother and
father of a child born out of wedlock is a legal contract, and the admission by the father of
his fatherhood of the child is sufficient consideration to support the contract.").
61. See generally In re Baby Girl P., 802 A.2d 1192 (N.H. 2002).
62. See generally id. at 1194.
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biological moms to thwart parental initiatives by biological dads.63 Only a
biological mom is always present at birth; often only she controls the flow
of information on her pregnancy and its aftermath.64 Unfortunately, many
paternity laws today unfairly prompt paternal rights or assign paternal
responsibilities for biological dads without taking proper account of
maternal conduct.65 As well, paternity laws today at times also unfairly
allow others, such as the husbands of biological mothers or men who
mistakenly assert biological ties, to play too key a role in legal paternity
proceedings involving true biological dads.
66
II. ILLUSTRATING UNFAIR LEGAL PATERNITY PROCEDURES
Varying forms of procedural unfairness in legal paternity designations
are illustrated in recent West Virginia litigation involving a badly-acting
mom, a deceived biological dad, and a man mistaken as to paternity who
actually fathered for a while.67  While the records in the cases were
incomplete, the following pertinent facts were judicially found.68
Mr. K. filed for divorce from Ms. P. in July 1994, about a month
before she gave birth to Robert.69 At the time of birth, no father's name
was listed on Robert's birth certificate.70 Shortly after Robert's birth, on
October 12, 1994, Mr. C. and Ms. P. completed a notarized paternity
acknowledgment for Robert indicating that Mr. C. was the biological
father. 71 Later, Robert's birth certificate was amended to add Mr. C. and to
give Mr. C.'s last name to Robert. 72 Mr. K. and Ms. P. were divorced in
63. See, e.g., id. at 1193-94.
64. See supra notes 61-62.
65. Baby Girl P., 802 A.2d at 1196.
66. The unfairness to biological dads due to the improper account under law of
maternal and third party conduct is occasionally recognized. See, e.g., In re Jerry P., 116
Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 138 (Ct. App. 2002), op. superseded, In re Jerry P., 46 P.3d 331 (Cal.
2002), and review dismissed & remanded, 53 P.3d 133 (Cal. 2002) (Unconstitutional for
statute to deny a biological dad his constitutionally-protected opportunity to establish
paternity at or shortly after birth by vesting in a biological mother "unilateral" control even
where the dad promptly steps up and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental
responsibilities). But cf Baby Girl P., 802 A.2d at 1197 (Mom's perjured affidavit and her
failure to identify or notify unwed biological dad in adoption setting that caused dad to miss
timely appearance in adoption case was irrelevant when statutory prerequisites to dad's
participation were applied).
67. Michael George K., 531 S.E.2d at 671-72.
68. Id. at 671.
69. Id.
70. Id.




December 1994, through a court order stating there were no children born
into the marriage. 73 In March 1995, a state agency sued Mr. C. in Raleigh
County to obtain child support for Robert. 74 In the suit Mr. C. was tested at
his request and was found not to be Robert's biological father.75 In
October 1996, this support case was voluntarily dismissed.76 In June 1997,
a similar but separate support case was presented by the same state agency
against Mr. K. in Fayette County.7 7 There, Mr. K. was shown by blood
tests to be Robert's biological father.78 The agency lawyer in the second
case, perhaps because it was pending in a different West Virginia county,
"may not have known the details of the earlier legal action" involving Mr.
C.7 9 In June 1998, the second trial court declared Mr. K. to be the "legal
father" and to owe child support. 80 At the same time, it ordered Mr. K.'s
name to be placed on Robert's birth certificate. 8 1 When Mr. K. learned in
July 1998, that Mr. C. was already on the certificate, he moved to set aside
the June 1998 orders.8 2 Though he prevailed in the trial court, the state
agency appealed and won, with the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals finding that Mr. K. was the legal father of Robert.83
While assuming the truth of Mr. K.'s assertion that Ms. P. "did
everything she could" for several years to hide Robert's biological
parentage, the high court nevertheless ruled that such "concealment", even
if "inequitable" as to Mr. K., "ordinarily" can not "be attributed to an
innocent child so as to weigh substantially on behalf of freeing a biological
father from the responsibilities of supporting his offspring." 84 As well, it
held "the implicit decree of non-paternity" within the divorce court order
could not benefit Mr. K. "in an action brought on behalf of the child to







80. Id. at 672-73.
81. Id. at673.
82. Id. at 672-73.
83. Id. at 678.
84. Id. at 678. See also L.V. v. R.S., 788 A.2d 881, 882-85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2002). For a somewhat differing view involving whether a mother's "fraudulent
concealment" can toll the time period for an acknowledged father to disestablish legal
patemity; see, e.g,. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/7(b-5), 45/8(a)(4); Lipscomb v. Wells,
761 N.E.2d 218, 222-25 (111. App. Ct. 2001). An action by a man to disestablish his legal
paternity that was earlier adjudicated may be brought within two years from the time he




obtain support." 85 While noting that Mr. C. was not involved as a "party"
in the child support action against Mr. K. (but in "hindsight" should have
been), it did note that had Mr. K. won the second suit, then "further
proceedings against Mr. C. would probably succeed in the long run," since
one of the two men (barring "some unforeseen intervening event") is
"likely going to be held responsible for child support" and since the suit
against Mr. K. "is fairly seen as a conflict between the two paternities."
86
The high court did note that the legal issues raised on appeal by the
state and against Mr. K. were not "adequately" presented in the trial
court.87  Yet this "neglect" would not be attributed to Robert to his
detriment. 88 In part, the court said this neglect encompassed the failure of
the state to insist on "the proper involvement ... of a guardian" for Robert,
deemed "essential when paternity is an issue before a court."
89
Were the legal paternity procedures unfair in the varying state-
controlled mechanisms used to designate legal paternity for Robert?
Consider first the initial birth certificate for Robert on which no father was
named. 90 A West Virginia statute, both at the time of Robert's birth and
now, demands: "If the mother was married either at the time of conception
or birth, the name of the husband shall be entered on the certificate as the
father of the child unless paternity has been determined otherwise by a
court of competent jurisdiction .... 91 Had Mr. K. been named on the
certificate at the request of Ms. P., as required by the statute, perhaps he
would have inquired and learned earlier that the lack of biological ties and
the one-time maternal inclinations of wives do not necessarily foreclose all
future paternal responsibilities for husbands.
Consider next the notarized paternity acknowledgment for Robert by
Mr. C., which he had to include under West Virginia law writings by both
Mr. C. and Ms. P. but not by Mr. K.,92 though Mr. K. had been married to
85. Michael George K., 531 S.E.2d at 678.
86. Id. at 677. The court did not explain how a finding of non-paternity based upon
biology in the suit against Mr. K. would likely mean the earlier lawsuit finding of non-
paternity based upon biology was wrong as to Mr. C. Is it not more likely, given the
accuracy of blood tests, that there was another man and additional "concealment" by Ms.
P.? Id. at 678.
87. Id. at 675.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 671.
91. W. VA. CODE § 16-5-12(g) (2002).
92. Id. Under a 1989 West Virginia statute on paternity, acknowledgment by an
alleged natural father, "consent" by the natural mother is also needed, together with findings
that a state circuit court judge is "satisfied" the male "applicant is the natural fatlier and that
establishment of the relationship is for the best interest of the child .. " Upon such acts the
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Ms. P. throughout the pregnancy and birth, in a setting where at least Ms.
P. knew that Mr. K. could be the biological father. Seemingly, Mr. K. was
unaware of these writings when made in 1994, and of the later alteration of
Robert's birth certificate naming Mr. C. as the father of Robert. 93 Had he
been notified, Mr. K. likely would have altered his thinking, and perhaps
his conduct, as to his own potential parental responsibilities and any
existing legal paternity presumption.
Next consider the 1995 state agency proceeding in Raleigh County
against Mr. C.94  Here too Mr. K. was unaware. 95  The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals did not expressly lament either Mr. K.'s absence
or the lack of "proper involvement" of a guardian ad litem on behalf of
Robert.96 Had Mr. K. and Robert been present, the "conflict between the
two paternities" would have been resolved then, not later.
97
Finally, consider the 1997 state agency proceeding in Fayette County
against Mr. K.98 Here, the lack of involvement by both Mr. C. and Robert
concerned the Supreme Court.99 But, Ms. P. was also not present, leaving
ensuing court order establishes the child as "the child of the applicant, as though born to him
in lawful wedlock." W. VA. CODE § 48 A-6-6 (1989). The statute was amended in 1995,
calling for written paternity acknowledgments to be "filed with the state registrar of vital
statistics" and mandating "new" birth certificates. W. VA. CODE § 48A-6-6 (1995). These
acknowledgments establish the men as fathers "for all purposes." Id. An acknowledgment
became revocable if "a court of competent jurisdiction finds that such acknowledgment was
obtained by fraud or duress." Id. The statute was again amended in 1997, making a
paternity acknowledgment subject to rescission within the earlier of sixty days from the date
of its execution or of the date of an administrative or judicial proceeding relating to the child
in which the signatory is a party. W. VA. CODE § 48 A-6-6(d) (1997). After sixty days, an
acknowledgment may only be challenged "on the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake
of fact, upon a finding of clear and convincing evidence by a court .. " Id. Today, the
West Virginia law on "written, notarized" paternity acknowledgments still requires filing
with the vital statistics registrar. W. VA. CODE § 16-5-12(i), (i)(3) (2002).
Acknowledgments may still only be rescinded after sixty days for "fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact.., upon a finding of clear and convincing evidence .... W. VA. CODE §
16-5-12(i)(4)(C) (2002).
93. Michael George K., 531 S.E.2d at 672.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 675. As well, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did not discuss
any inadequacy in the presentations in the earlier support action by the state agency against
Mr. C., such as why estoppel did not operate to preclude Mr. C. from contesting paternity as
the paternity acknowledgment and related order under the West Virginia statute established
Robert as the child of Mr. C. "as though born to him in lawful wedlock." W. VA. CODE §
48A-6-6 (1989). For discussions of paternity by estoppel, see, e.g., K. B. v. D. B., 639
N.E.2d 725, 727-31 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994); see generally B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514
(Alaska 1999).
97. Michael George K., 531 S.E.2d at 674.
98. Id. at 672.
99. Id at 677.
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Mr. K.'s allegations as to her "concealment" unanswered.100 While
deeming the 1997 suit "a conflict between the two paternities," the court
did not describe the most appropriate means for resolving this conflict or
what earlier procedures might have foreclosed the need for the 1997
litigation.
1 1
The West Virginia legal procedures for designating male parentage
for Robert as of the time of his birth were employed in fundamentally
unfair ways. They did not promote early, accurate, informed and
conclusive legal paternity designations. 102 While the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals acknowledged certain procedural deficiencies,
neither it nor the state legislature has since taken corrective measures.
10 3
How can legal paternity designations be better processed for Robert and for
other children? How should legal paternity procedures treat biological
dads like Mr. K., biological moms and wives like Ms. P., and alleged
biological dads and one-time actual fathers like Mr. C.?
HI. CREATING FAIRER LEGAL PATERNITY PROCEDURES
A. Significant Time Periods
In exploring how legal paternity designations may be more fairly
made, inquiries are needed into the conduct of biological dads, biological
moms, children, social parents and others at three different times, namely,
before the birth, at the time of the birth, and after the birth of the child.
10 4
For a legal paternity designation based upon child support actually received
from the biological dad, prebirth, at birth and/or postbirth acts may all be
relevant, depending upon context. 10 5 The ability of a biological dad to
secure childrearing rights through child support payments, however, often
depends not only on his own acts, but also upon the acts of the biological
mother, which themselves might depend upon the acts of others like her
100. Id. at 678.
101. Id. at 677.
102. Id. at671-72.
103. Id. at 675, 676 n.6, 677 n.10.
104. Not all procedural law problems associated with legal paternity determinations are
considered herein. Elsewhere, difficulties have been found in statutes failing to provide
much information on conduct that may cause the loss of parental opportunities. See, e.g., In
re D.F., 748 N.E.2d 271, 280-82 (II1. App. Ct. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 755 N.E.2d
477 (111. 2001) (Adoption Act void for vagueness in that it fails to describe adequately how
"neglect" or "misconduct" can lead to termination of parental rights).
105. Michael George K., 531 S.E.2d at 671.
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parents or her husband (or guys like Mr. C.).
106
Paternity laws can cause some future biological dads to lose their
opportunities for parental rights because of prebirth conduct. 107 State laws
guiding a "natural father's unique opportunity"'1 8 to grasp parenthood can
operate primarily or exclusively before birth even where the dads were
unaware of, or misled about, the pregnancies. Thus, biological dads may
lose parental rights in adoption proceedings through their failures to
provide prebirth support 10 9 even though they did not know, and could not
have reasonably known, of their impending offspring." 0  Similarly,
biological dads may lose parental rights in adoption cases through their
failures to pursue prebirth paternity actions.111 While prebirth support or
paternity action failures may end future parental rights, they do not
necessarily eliminate future parental responsibilities for biological dads.
For example, prebirth failures often only mean that biological dads have no
rights to individualized notices of the possible adoptions of their offspring,
though these same dads may be pursued later for child support in paternity
actions brought on behalf of their offspring, at times after anticipated
adoptions fizzle. 112 The potential for unfair procedures seems great when
the prebirth conduct of biological dads is legally relevant.
As well, paternity laws can cause some biological dads to lose
106. Id. at 672-73.
107. Id. at 673.
108. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129.
109. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 746 (Fla. 1989); In re Adoption
of Baby E.A.W., 658 So.2d 961, 967 (Fla. 1995) (Prebirth child abandonment negating need
for biological father to consent to adoption).
110. See, e.g., In re Paternity of Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d 281, 285, 287 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000) (Stating in an adoption setting "[a]lthough we have found no Indiana cases addressing
this issue, other courts from sister states considering cases similar to this one have placed
the responsibility for promptly asserting parental rights on the putative father, even when the
mother of the child has attempted to prevent the father's knowledge of or contact with the
child .... We further agree... that a child should not be made to suffer when a putative
father is ignorant of his parenthood due to his fleeting relationship with the mother and her
unwillingness to notify him about the pregnancy. The child should also not be made to
suffer when a putative father makes no inquiry regarding the possibility of a pregnancy.").
Cf. Doe v. Queen, 552 S.E.2d 761, 764 (S.C. 2001) (Biological dad's consent to adoption is
needed as his "strict" compliance with prebirth support duty is excused, when caused by
"the whim" of the biological mom, where the dad acted sufficiently and promptly upon
learning of birth).
111. See, e.g, In re Paternity of M.G.S., 756 N.E.2d 990, 997-98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
(Where putative father fails to file a prebirth paternity action within thirty days of receiving
notice of mother's intent to place child for adoption, he gives his "irrevocable implied
consent" to the adoption under statute even though he registered with the putative father
registry twenty-three days after his child was born, which occurred before any adoption
petition was filed).
112. Id. at 1001-03.
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parental rights because of conduct at or near the time of birth.1 3 Some
laws terminate at or shortly after birth the unique chance to grasp
parenthood in settings where the biological dad was unaware of or deceived
about the newborn child.114 And again, at birth conduct may end future
paternal rights but not future paternal responsibilities.' 1 5 For example, a
married woman whose newborn she knows is biologically tied to a man
who is not her husband, may conceal such ties and name her husband as the
father on the birth certificate, prompting only for the husband parental
rights and responsibilities. 116  Yet, usually upon divorce, often she can
rebut the presumption and pursue the biological father in court for child
support based upon scientific tests which she prompts, 117 though the
biological father long ago may have lost any real chance to grasp his
unique opportunity to establish an "enduring" parent-child relationship.
Unfair procedures, thus, can arise during legal paternity designations
founded on conduct at the time of birth. "1
8
Finally, paternity laws can prompt some biological dads to lose
parental rights because of their postbirth failures to step up to
parenthood.1 9 They too can operate where these dads were unaware or
deceived and again, the loss of rights does not always trigger immunity
from responsibilities. 120 For example, limitation periods, such as two years
from the time of birth,121 may bar paternity actions by biological dads
113. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-9-5 (Michie 2002).
114. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy K., 546 N.W.2d 86, 101 (S.D. 1996). See also
discussion infra note 122.
115. Paternity of M.G.S., 756 N.E.2d at 997-99.
116. See, e.g., Baby Girl P., 802 A.2d at 1195-96.
117. Id.
118. Consider, as well, adoption laws foreclosing unwed biological dads from even
receiving notice of adoption proceedings because they failed to initiate paternity actions or
to hold themselves out as fathers shortly after birth, even though such actions were
practically impossible given the moms' deceit or failures to identify the dads. Id. at 1198
(Dads, even those out-of-state and deceived, must act before moms consent to adoption in
order to be entitled to notice; here, consent by mom to adoption occurred ten days after
birth).
119. See, e.g., Paternity ofM.G.S., 756 N.E.2d at 997-98.
120. See infra note 122.
121. But see In re Adoption of Baby Girl H., 635 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Neb. 2001)
(upholding thirty-five day time period within which putative father must act to challenge a
proposed adoption, in a setting where a lawsuit was required and where one was actually
filed by the father in a timely manner, but where the filing occurred in the wrong court);
Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355, 366-68 (Minn. 2002) (Registration on Fathers'
Adoption Registry on thirty-first day after birth failed to meet thirty day rule that would
have prompted for the putative father the right to notice of future adoption proceedings;
substantial compliance was insufficient and unwed mother had no fiduciary duty to notify
the putative father of her whereabouts).
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desiring parental rights, even when they seek legal paternity as soon as they
learn of their children's births in settings where their earlier ignorance was
beyond their control.1 22 Yet, paternity actions against these same men on
behalf of children seeking child support are not similarly barred.
1 23
Support claims may even be pursued by teenaged girls who, until then,
believed that other men were their biological dads.' 24  In paternity
designation settings where postbirth conduct is relevant, unfair procedures
abound.
B. New Birth Certificate Laws
Without altering the substantive law guidelines, though they too may
be fairly criticized, American legal paternity procedures founded on
inquiries into prebirth, at birth and postbirth acts can most easily be
improved by reforming birth certificate laws.125 If birth certificates entered
at or shortly after the time of birth, and if later birth certificates and birth
certificate amendments, more accurately and comprehensively addressed
122. See, e.g., Baby Boy K., 546 N.W.2d at 101 (Unwed mother's failure to tell
biological father of pregnancy and her misrepresentation to the trial court about the father's
identity did not warrant exception to sixty day statutory time period, within which biological
father had to assert paternity or lose any right to notice of a parental rights termination case
involving his child); Paternity of Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d at 285-287 (similar cases
reviewed).
123. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/7 (West 2002). Yet actions by biological
mothers to disestablish one man's earlier legal paternity designation, so as to establish legal
paternity or legal fatherhood for another man, may be barred after a certain time, at least
where the mother knew during the relevant time that the first man was not the biological
father. See, e.g., Donath v. Buckley, 744 N.E.2d 385, 388-389 (Il1. App. Ct. 2001) (Two
year statute bars mother in setting where earlier designated father has no desire to sever
parent-child ties).
124. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 517 (McKinney 1998) ("Proceedings to establish
the paternity of a child may be instituted during the pregnancy ... or after the birth..., but
shall not be brought after the child reaches the age of twenty-one years, unless paternity has
been acknowledged by the father in writing or by furnishing support.").
125. Any reforms of unfair procedures in other legal paternity settings, as with
paternity acknowledgments and paternity cases, are not addressed herein. Nor does the
paper look to legal procedures which may be unfair to biological dads in settings not
directly involving legal paternity designations, as in the recent statutes permitting safe
havens for abandoned babies. See, e.g., 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2/30 (West 2002)
("[R]elinquishing [parent]," usually a biological mom, has a "right to remain anonymous
and to leave.., and not be followed or pursued," when abandoning a child who was not
abused or neglected, though the biological dad is unknown to state officials.). Commentaries
include Tanya Anset, Note, South Carolina's Safe Haven for Abandoned Infants Act: A
"Band-Aid" Remedy for the Baby-Dumping "Epidemic", 53 S.C. L. Rev. 151 (2001);
Michael S. Raum & Jeffrey L. Skaare, Encouraging Abandonment: The Trend Towards
Allowing Parents to Drop Off Unwanted Newborns, 76 N.D. L. Rev. 511 (2000) (reviewing
safe haven laws).
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the parental status of all involved men, including husbands, biological dads,
and adopting dads, societal and individual interests in early, accurate, and
conclusive legal paternity designations would be promoted. Any later
inquiries into legal paternity could more frequently employ these
certificates, thereby avoiding duplication, excessive expense, and the
undermining of settled expectations. How might birth certificates be
entered more fairly?
126
A birth certificate typically is entered under state law shortly after the
birth of a child. 127 It normally contains either the names or the signatures
of the man and woman said to be the child's parents.' 28  Frequently,
designations of male parentage are neither corroborated nor supported by
admissible evidence, as when they are based solely on the written
statements of an unmarried mother and an alleged father. 129  Where
affidavits are required, often when moms are unmarried, there is often little
done to insure their accuracy. 130 Often, designations of male parentage are
126. The following suggestions address possible changes in American state laws, as
neither federal laws nor local laws historically have addressed birth certificate procedures or
such related matters as paternity acknowledgments or trial court adjudications of paternity.
Should Congress become interested, it is unclear how far it may go in reforming birth
certificate laws given recent Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment developments. But
see Harding v. Harding, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 450, 457 (Ct. App. 2002) (Federal Full Faith and.
Credit for Child Support Orders Act is constitutional). State law reforms would be greatly
facilitated if uniform standards were newly debated and proposed by such groups as the
National Conference on Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, whose earlier related
works include the UNIF. ILLEGITIMACY ACT (1922), the BLOOD TESTS TO DETERMINE
PATERNITY ACT (1952), the UNIF. PATERNITY ACT (1960), the UNIF. PUTATIVE AND
UNKNOWN FATHERS ACT (1988), the UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION
ACT (1988), and the UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000). The latter work is especially helpful, as
it deals with legal paternity designations for both marital and nonmarital children. See
generally, e.g., Paula Roberts, Biology and Beyond: The Case for the Passage of the New
Uniform Parentage Act, 35 FAM. L.Q. 41 (2001). The Uniform Parentage Act contains
provisions on nonmarital children necessary for states seeking federal funding for their child
support and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families programs. See, e.g., Title IV-D
(national child support enforcement program) and Title IV-A (welfare funding program),
including 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(i), (D)(ii)(I) (2002) (voluntary paternity
acknowledgments must be available; once filed, usually they will ripen into legal paternity
determinations without any court orders and they can only be rescinded within sixty days of
parental signings).
127. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 535/12(1) (West 2002).
128. See, e.g., id. 535/12(2).
129. See, e.g., id. 535/12(4), (5) (witnessed signatures of mother and father where
mother is unwed); cf. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 535/12(2), (4) (only "personal signatures"
of husband and wife received when wife delivers child and there is no indication that the
husband is not the biological father).
130. See, e.g., Slusher v. Slusher, 43 S.W.3d 189, 192 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001) (J. Neal,
concurring).
In... [Arkansas], if the mother of a child is not married at the time of either
2003]
Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 53:57
grounded only on a legal presumption, as when the mothers are married,
131
where the presumption may be rebutted by biological dads, but where there
is no effort to identify or notify these dads.1 32 The public usually can not
access birth certificates; 133 thus, errors can not be revealed and parental
rights and duties may not be known in the community.
Birth certificates can also be incomplete, often with information on
male parentage missing. Male parents most frequently go unnamed where
the female parents are unmarried at the time of birth. 134 The number of
incomplete birth certificates surely increased in the last forty years due to
the rise in the number of births to unmarried mothers. In 1960, in the
United States, five out of every one hundred children were born to
unmarried mothers; by 1994, about one third of all children were born to
unmarried mothers.1 35 Notwithstanding the increase in unmarried moms
and the likely increase in incomplete birth certificates, state laws continue
to do little to encourage the full, accurate, informed, and timely completion
of birth records where moms are unmarried. 36 Where birth certificates for
conception or birth, the name of the father is not to be entered on the child's birth
certificate unless the mother and the putative father sign an affidavit of paternity.
Prior to signing ... the mother and natural father are given written information
explaining the implications of signing the affidavit and their resulting parental
rights and responsibilities. Once the mother and putative father execute an
acknowledgment ... the man executing.., is the father.., for all intents and
purposes and the acknowledgments... constitute a conclusive finding of
paternity.
Id. (citations omitted).
131. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5 (West 2002) (presumption of paternity); see
also 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 535/12(4).
132. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/7 (who may bring action to determine the
father child relationship); see also 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 535/12(7).
133. See, e.g., KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.131 (Banks-Baldwin 2001) (no access to
vital records except as authorized by statute, regulation or court order); ILL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 77 § 500.20(c) (2002) (information collected for birth certificate shall be "maintained in
a confidential manner").
134. The data is hard to locate. But see Parness, supra note 9, at 577 n.20 (October
1991 survey of all Illinois medical facilities believed to provide obstetrical services); Ann
Nichols-Casebolt, Paternity Adjudication: In the Best Interests of the Out-of- Wedlock-Child,
67 CHILD WELFARE 245, 245 (1988) (The majority of out-of-wedlock kids never have
paternity adjudicated).
135. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SER. 21 No. 53, BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED MOTHERS:
UNITED STATES, 1980-92 8 (1995); NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Vol. 44 No. 11,
Advance Report of Final Natality Statistics 3 (1994), cited in Battle Robinson & Susan
Paikin, Who Is Daddy? A Case for the Uniform Parentage Act (2000), 19 DEL. LAW. 23, 23
n.3 (2001).
136. Inaction may be traced to legislative concerns with cohabitation rather than with
such births, but legislative failures nevertheless remain unjustified. See, e.g., Ann Laquer
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children of unmarried moms are incomplete, usually for the moms there is
no legal "duty to notify" the biological dads of "the birth of the child"'1 37 as
well as no legal duty to secure for the child a designation of legal paternity
where one is available.' 38 While birth certificates may be completed (or
amended) later, changes to reflect the actual biological dads usually are not
mandated and later governmental inquiries into missing information are not
very searching 139 or are not made at all.
140
Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 13 81, 1408 (2001) which concludes:
Those who believe that law is a useful too for shaping family behavior sometimes
argue for maintaining a strong distinction between cohabitation and marriage in
order to channel couples into marriage. The experience of the past quarter
century, however, is not encouraging on this front. With more than four million
cohabiting couples in the United States today, the law's failure to address
cohabitation is increasingly difficult to justify. One result of the fear that
cohabitation will encroach further on marriage is that the courts have largely taken
themselves out of the process of creating broader social norms to govern
nonmarital relationships.
Cohabitation has become well established as a demographic reality and an
emerging social practice. In the law, however, cohabitation is still regarded as
anomalous, and its consequences remain highly indeterminate .... [C]ohabitants
are still left to their own devising, in a space set off between legal rules.
Id. (citation omitted).
137. See, e.g., In re TMK, 617 N.W.2d 925, 926-27 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (Biological
dad, who knew of the pregnancy in 1994 and whose relationship with the biological mother
ended before birth, could not complain in 1999 when the mom's husband sought to adopt).
There the court rejected the ground that the biological dad had been afforded no real chance
to provide postbirth child support (which would have prompted for him a parental fitness
hearing under In re Dawson, 591 N.W.2d 433, 435 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)) since the mom
did not advise the biological dad of the child's birth until 1999 and she never sought child
support from him. In re TMK, 617 N.W.2d at 926-27.
138. See, e.g., Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355, 368 (Minn. 2002) (No fiduciary
duty on unwed biological mom to disclose her location at the time of birth "to the putative
father even if she knows he wants to ... establish a relationship with his child," where she
opts not to parent and for an adoption). Yet, to promote the best interests of children not
only do moms owe their born alive children many legal duties in varying contexts, but at
least some expectant moms also owe their unborn children certain comparable duties. See,
e.g., Nat'l Cas. Co. v. N. Trust Bank of Fla., N.A., 807 So.2d 86, 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (child has claim against mom based on her prenatal negligence causing an auto
accident, at least to the extent of her insurance coverage). On other prebirth maternal duties,
see Jeffrey A. Parness, Arming the Pregnancy Police: More Outlandish Concoctions, 53
LA. L. REV. 427, 430-435 (1992).
139. Thus, when an unwed biological mother places her child for adoption shortly after
birth, usually she is not required to identify the biological father (or the suspects) by name
and her account of the biological dad's disinterest, abandonment, failure of support and the
like, though usually in an affidavit, is taken at face value. See, e.g., Evans v. S.C. Dep't. of
Soc. Ser., 399 S.E.2d 156, 157 (S.C. 1990) (determining mother's affidavit is sufficient even
where the biological father's identity and whereabouts might be gleaned through
governmental pressure on the mother [reveal his name or your name will be used in the
adoption proceedings]). At times, it is later learned that the account of a biological mom and
the account of the biological dad vary dramatically. See, e.g., Brown v. Malloy, 546 S.E.2d
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While the birth certificate typically is the first, it often is not the last
legal designation of paternity.14 1 Multiple and inconsistent legal
designations of male parentage often are made for a single child. 142  For
example, although a birth certificate may designate the husband of a new
mother as the "presumed" father, the mother, the husband, the biological
father, or the child may have some standing in a later court proceeding to
challenge this presumption. 143 Further, although an order in a marriage
dissolution proceeding, as well as an earlier birth certificate, may designate
a married couple as the legal parents, this designation may be challenged in
a later paternity action brought by the child or perhaps by an alleged
biological father, as neither was party to the earlier designations. 144 Recall
the West Virginia litigation involving Robert, where an incomplete birth
certificate was followed by inconsistent legal paternity designations
accomplished through a notarized paternity acknowledgment; an amended
birth certificate; a child support case finding; and, another child support
case finding.
145
One way to encourage better legal designations of paternity is to
promote more complete, informed, and accurate birth records shortly after
birth with laws providing that expectant mothers, new mothers, and others
who are specially interested (including husbands and boyfriends) receive
better information about the legal consequences of birth. 146 For example,
195, 196-97 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001).
140. Thus, when an unwed biological mother maintains sole custody of a child with no
designation of legal paternity, usually she will not be prodded by government to complete
the birth certificate or otherwise to identify the father unless she seeks certain forms of
financial assistance from the government on behalf of her child. See, e.g., Paternity of
Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 491 (Mass. 2001) (reviewing federal and Massachusetts laws on
cooperation and "good faith" efforts). So, actress Jodie Foster's secrets on the reproductive
circumstances relevant to her two children likely will not receive governmental scrutiny.
Governmental efforts to obtain missing information as to legal paternity where the mother is
unmarried are lacking even in states where statutes seemingly require that both parents
usually be designated on birth certificates. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 535/12(2)
(For births in hospitals, hospital agents "shall obtain and record all the personal and
statistical particulars relative to the parents of the child that are required to properly
complete the live birth certificate," including the "required personal signatures."); ILL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 77 § 500.20(d) (2002) ("The father's signature shall be affixed to the
original birth certificate .... ").
141. See, e.g., Michael George K., 531 S.E.2d at 672.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/7 (determination of father and child
relationship; who may bring action).
144. Id.
145. See Michael George K., 531 S.E.2d at 672.
146. Information conveyed per state law as to the legal consequences of impending
births to men like Mr. K. may at times awaken the men to the pregnancies in which they
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those providing childbirth services could be required to pass on information
to all women and others about the laws on parental duties, including laws
on prebirth parental responsibilities; on presumed fatherhood; on the
support obligations of unmarried men; and on the duties of biological
fathers married to other women. 147 Some information should be distributed
long before birth. Social services, such as counseling, legal services and no
cost scientific testing, should be provided at times to those in need.
Laws promoting better legal paternity designations need not operate
exclusively prior to or immediately after birth. For example, those
specially interested in children without legally designated male parents at
the time of birth often need time to ponder the consequences of birth. Ms.
P. in the West Virginia litigation comes to mind. Additionally, DNA and
other paternity tests may not be immediately available for many
newborns. 148 Consideration therefore should be given to promoting more
conclusive legal paternity designations that occur shortly after birth, but
perhaps as long as a year or two later. Here, a man specially connected to a
child biologically, by marriage, or otherwise has more time, and likely a
legally sufficient amount, to establish an "enduring" parent-child
relationship. 149 The state could usually require periodic inquiry (by state
agents such as recordkeepers, by hospital personnel, or perhaps by others)
into the male parentage of a child whose birth record, without explanation,
lacks a male parent. These inquiries at least could involve the
dissemination of additional information on legal paternity and on available
governmental services. Consider how the legal paternity of Robert might
have been processed differently in West Virginia if Ms. P., and perhaps Mr.
K. who was then her husband, had received information about the relevant
laws shortly after Robert's incomplete birth certificate was filed. Legal
paternity designations should not be encouraged, however, in certain
postbirth settings as where a birth seemingly resulted from a criminal act or
have particular interests. Did Mr. K. even know Ms. P. was pregnant when he sued for
divorce?
147. See, e.g., Michael D. Resnick et al., The Fate of the Non-Marital Child: A
Challenge to the Health System, 19 J. COMTY. HEALTH 285, 298-299 (1994) (urging state
Human Services agencies to initiate such requirements). But see 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
535/12(5) (hospitals only required to pass such information on when birth is to "an
unmarried woman" or to a married woman who the hospitals know, or have reason to know,
delivered a child not biologically tied to her husband).
148. Health concerns may be significant for some newborns, while certain potential
biological fathers may be unavailable for testing at the time of birth.
149. See generally Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Settings, 54 PUB. WELFARE 44
(1996) (a review of reasons why voluntary paternity acknowledgments often are not secured
at hospitals at the time of birth).
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where a mother reasonably fears abuse.
150
Finally, lawmakers should also consider more seriously the
circumstances appropriate for 'revived' legal paternity. Here, biological
ties would be employed to permit certain men a second chance to develop
"enduring" parent-child relationships and to prompt paternal rights. Unlike
retroactive legal paternity, where paternity based on biology is established
long after birth but relates back in time to the date of birth, revived rights
would be based, at least in part, on biology but would not relate back.
151
Revived rights should be considered for children having no legal or actual
fathers where the children would benefit from actual "enduring"
relationships with their biological fathers, though other prospective fathers
(such as adopters) might also be available. 152 For example, revived legal
paternity might be available for an unwed biological dad who wishes to
step up to fatherhood after his child's unwed mother seeks child support or
dies in a setting where the child is young and there are no extended family
members related to the mother who themselves look to step up. Revived
legal paternity may even be made available to a wed biological dad, as Mr.
150. Analogies can be drawn to abortion notice laws where compulsory notice to
certain expectant fathers is excepted. Of course, before excusing notice based on a crime or
fear of abuse, an adequate evidentiary record (sealed) should be established. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 908-909 (1992) (exceptions in the
Pennsylvania law on spousal notification of abortion were invalidated. No notice was
required when pregnancy was caused by another man or by spousal sexual assault, as well
as when notice might lead to bodily injury).
151. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Kates, 761 N.E.2d 153, 160 (Il. 2001) (revival for a
biological dad after a biological mom allows DNA testing only after considerable time has
passed after birth, where testing results in the disestablishment of the earlier adjudication of
legal paternity of another man). Id. (Statute on disestablishing legal paternity "implicitly
allows a mother ... to refuse to submit to DNA testing" even where it may be in the child's
best interests). Id.
152. See, e.g., Wenzelman ex rel. Wenzelman v. Bennett, 748 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (I11.
App. 2001) (In speaking on the general presumption that all biological parents are entitled to
visitation, court said:
any parent, in wedlock or out of wedlock, that seeks to establish extensive
visitation after eight years of no contact with a child has the burden to show that
visitation is in the child's best interests. Absent any indication that no prior
relationship existed between parent and child, we determine that a presumption
exists in favor of biological parents for visitation.);
Illinois Dep't of Public Aid ex rel. Gagnon-Dix by Dix v. Gagnon, 680 N.E.2d 509, 512 (III.
App. 1997) (precedent leading to ruling in Wenzelman). Compare LA. CHILD. CODE. art.
1255(B) (1995 & Supp. 2002) ("[R]ebuttable presumption" that intrafamily adoption by
grandparents or stepparent "is in the best interests of the child."), with W. VA. CODE § 49-2-
14(e) (2002) (Sibling preference standard in adoption and foster care settings which seeks to
"unite or reunite siblings"), applied in In re Carol B., 550 S.E.2d 636, 639 (W. Va. 2001)
(holding that sibling preference was not overcome by clear and convincing evidence). But
see Carter v. Carter, 546 S.E.2d 220, 221 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (When adoption by stepparent
is followed by a divorce, no presumption of custody in favor of the biological parent).
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K. who seemingly failed to grasp parenthood earlier on, but whose
biological child later became fatherless when the support suit against Mr.
C. was voluntarily dismissed.'
53
These suggested initiatives and others promoting better legal paternity
designations are not without drawbacks. Requirements prompting new or
additional governmental investigations of procreational activities would
undercut the actual freedoms enjoyed today by many women regarding
male involvement in their children's lives, perhaps implicating at times the
federal constitutional informational privacy, procreational, and childrearing
rights of these women. 154 Further, the reality that many biological dads are
not involved in their children's lives also might be diminished.
Contemporary freedoms and constitutional interests of adults will need to
be balanced carefully with the children's and the government's interests in
better legal paternity designations. Undoubtedly, the balancing will be
difficult on occasion.
Concerns about promoting only traditional, two-parent designations
also arise. New laws promoting better legal paternity designations should
not mean that all or most children should have at least one male parent
under law. A child born as a result of a rape or artificial insemination by an
anonymous donor may never have a male parent recognized under law.
155
153. Even if "revived" legal paternity did become available to Mr. K. when the June,
1997 support suit against him was commenced, revival should not always depend upon the
fortuity of Ms. P.'s poverty and on the government's attempt to aid her.
154. See, e.g., Livsey v. Salt Lake County, 275 F.3d 952, 955-956 (10th Cir. 2001)
(Federal constitutional privacy right, encompassing individual interests in avoiding
governmental disclosure of personal matters, can require a compelling governmental interest
in the disclosure of intimate marital matters even where there is a legitimate governmental
need to investigate); Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 873-875 (App. 2000)
(Parents and child could compel a semen donor's deposition and the production of relevant
documents from a sperm bank because the agreement between the sperm bank and the
sperm buyers precluding disclosure of the donor's identity and related information was
unenforceable due to its conflict with the state's compelling interests in the health and
welfare of its children); Planned Parenthood v. Iowa Dist. Ct., No. 02-1191 (Iowa
continuance filed Aug. 12, 2002) (Issues concern a prosecutor's ability to obtain pregnancy
records from a private clinic relevant to its search for parent(s) who left an infant's body at a
recycling center).
155. See, e.g., State ex rel. D.R.M. 34 P.3d 887, 892 (Wash. App. 2001).
The State suggests the child must have two parents and both must be accountable
to support the child. Does a child have to have two parents? ... No ....
[c]onsider... instances where a child may have only one parent. The law allows
relinquishment of parental rights by one parent. A parent may have.., parental
rights terminated. The State may block a paternity action based on the child's best
interests, resulting in a single parent for the child. The adoption statute does not
limit adoption to married couples; single people are eligible to adopt. The law
does not prohibit artificial insemination of a single woman that could result in
only one parent for the child. The surrogacy statute does not limit surrogacy to
Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 53:57
Similarly, a two-parent setting need not inevitably involve at least one man.
A child born to an unmarried woman who has been artificially inseminated
by an anonymous donor could, practically speaking, have two female
parents and no male parent in certain settings, as perhaps with the children
of singer Melissa Etheridge and Julie Cypher, where singer David Crosby
(at the apparent urging of his wife) became a genetic dad but not a parent,
at least not yet,156 by doing what he called the "perfectly natural thing.',
157
In considering reforms to birth certificate laws, lawmakers should also
ask whether our laws should continue to limit a child to only one or two
parents. Some children may benefit if they were designated under law as
having three or more parents as of the time of birth. In Louisiana, the
concept of dual paternity provides that a mother, a mother's husband at the
time of birth, and a biological father may all have legal duties to a child,
although they all may not share the same rights of parentage.158  In a
society where divorce and remarriage are commonplace, many children
today have four actual parents, although they all are not always recognized
fully under law. Thus, there are parental-like legal duties imposed on many
stepparents, as when children live in their homes, though some of these,




156. In Sweden recently a known sperm donor who helped a lesbian couple have three
children was deemed by a court liable to pay child support after the two women separated.
Karl Ritter, Swedish Court Rules Sperm Donor is Legal Father of Three, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Feb. 1, 2002, at I (reporting that the man's girlfriend persuaded him to donate sperm
and that the lesbian couple had earlier agreed to handle all parental responsibilities).
157. Chuck Arnold, Chatter: Father's Say, PEOPLE MAG., Mar. 6, 2000, at 168. If
there was but one biological mother, only she may have parental rights recognized under
law. See, e.g., Sharon S. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107, 109
(App. 2001) (Second parent adoptions used by same-sex female couples disallowed under
general state adoption statutes, though a new law does allow a registered domestic partner to
adopt the other partner's child), review granted, 39 P.3d 512 (Cal. 2002); In re Adoption of
Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Neb. 2002) (biological mom's companion could not adopt
under state statute on adoption); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 555 (N.J. 2000) (One-time
partner in same-sex female couple may have become "psychological parent" to the child of
her fit and involved partner, thereby acquiring the power to seek visitation; the necessary
elements include an established relationship which was consented to and fostered by the
legal parent); State ex rel. D.R.M., 34 P.3d at 888 (Wash. App. 2001) (same-sex partner
who encouraged artificial insemination and birth for her partner may not later be held liable
for child support when partnership ends); see In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195,
1202 (Pa. 2002) (second parent adoptions by same-sex couples allowed).
158. See, e.g., T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So.2d 873, 875 (La. 1999) (recognizing both legal
and biological paternity); Bolden v. Rogers, 746 So.2d 88, 92 (La. App. 1999) (Biological
father's rights are not absolute; actual relationship with the child, established in a timely
manner, is "determinative").
159. See, e.g., Bodwell v. Brooks, 686 A.2d 1179, 1181 (N.H. 1996).
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Promoting earlier, more complete, more conclusive, more informed,
and more accurate legal paternity designations may mean that some men
who are biologically linked to children will lose forever the opportunity to
parent through no fault of their own. But this is already happening to many
men. 160  It may also mean that some men would bear forever the legal
designation of paternity because of their earlier assumptions or their past
reliance on false representations about their biological ties. 161 This too is
already happening. 162 And, it may mean that some women will be less able
to conceal the identities of biological dads. 163 These are not insignificant
costs. Nevertheless, our present procedures for designating legal paternity
seem more costly. American governments and most Americans have
significant interests in better assuring that a correct and lasting legal
designation of paternity is made for every child around the time of birth.
CONCLUSION
The substantive guidelines for legal designations of paternity as of the
time of birth vary significantly from state to state and often are quite varied
even in a single state depending upon context. These guidelines are usually
implemented through a variety of state-controlled procedures, including
mechanisms for birth certificates; paternity cases; marriage dissolution
cases involving child support, custody and visitation issues; and, paternity
registrations. Not infrequently these procedures do not adequately promote
the legitimate governmental interests in early, accurate, informed, and
conclusive legal paternity designations. Too often, undesirable conduct by
mothers or others leads to successive legal paternity designations, which
are inconsistent, fortuitous, and inconclusive, as well as to unfair losses of
160. See, e.g., Baby Boy K., 546 N.W.2d at 101.
161. See, e.g., People ex rel. J.A.U. v. R.L.C., 47 P.3d 327, 333 (Colo. 2002)
(Children's best interests foreclose paternity disestablishments by men who earlier
acknowledged paternity without genetic testing, though such results may seem to some
"harsh or unfair"; typically such foreclosures are said to promote "a policy in favor of
protecting children from belated resort to scientific proof as part of efforts to escape parental
responsibility."). While false representations about biological ties may not allow
disestablishment of legal paternity, they may also not prompt tort claims against biological
moms by biological dads. See, e.g., Day v. Heller, 653 N.W.2d 475, 478-82 (Neb. 2002)
(Ex-husband may not sue his ex-wife though there are conflicting rulings in other states).
162. See, e.g., People ex. Rel. J.A.U., 47 P.3d at 333.
163. See, e.g., Jones v. Murphy, 772 A.2d 502, 507 (Vt. 2001) (Dooley, J., concurring)
(In all cases, biological fathers should have the obligation to support their children unless all
parties involved knowingly and intentionally agree to a different financial arrangement.
Creating a choice in the mother to seek support either from her ex-husband or from the
biological father is neither fair to the ex-husband nor in the best interest of the child).
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paternal rights or unfair assignments of paternal responsibilities. American
paternity law reform is long overdue.
